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Abstract
Blind Signature scheme deals with the concept where requester sends the request
that the signer should sign on a blind message.Anyone can verify the signature after
publishing the information without any restriction.The proposed scheme having
the property of both concept, Identity based as well as Blind Signature using DLP.
With the help of Identity Based system we can easily archive the public key
certification without key-management setting. In several ID based scheme ID
map into an Elliptic curve, but we have a novel techniques to solve this problem.
We have proposed a scheme that is based on Discrete logarithm problem.We have
proved that our scheme meets all essential and secondary security prematurity.In
addition we have given the mathematically and pragmatically correctness of our
scheme. As our best of knowledge, we give the first discussion on these two
notation. Also, we proved that our scheme fulfill all criteria that should be meet
in a blind signature scheme.Our proposed scheme can be used in an E-commerce,
E-voting and E-cashing anywhere without any restriction.We have given an
application of E-cashing using our scheme.
Keywords: Blind Signature, E-voting, Key- Management,DLP,Correctness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A digital signature is basically a way which provides the authenticity to an
electronic document. A data stream concatenates a message with a valid entity
called digital signature. The concept of Digital Signature is first have given in
new direction cryptography by Diffie and hellaman [30]. Authenticity ensure the
legitimacy of document as well as the person who created it. It also gives a
guarantee that not any other person changed it since an authentic people developed
it.
Digital signatures count on some kind of encryption to give a guarantee of
authenticity. Encryption is a method in which we convert to message or file in
such a format that when we send to it from one system to be other then no one
decrypt it except the person who possess a key. Authentication ensured that the
message that we get come from a right person. Digital signature shows that the
data which we receive coming from a right people, it also showed a message cannot
be denied or alter by a sender later the submission. Digital signatures are basically
applied for financial transaction, distribution of software, in cases of controversy
where we want to check for tempering of digital information [13].
Blind Signature is a technique in which a user can get the sign on document
from a signer without showing the information that it stored [14]. In Blind
Signature technique, the basic motive is getting the signature from a person
without revealing secret information that document possessed. The property of
1
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Blind Signature is that requester can be enabled to get the signature, but the
signer party does not have any capability of making relation between signature
and document. When requester released the signature pair, both requester
and signer will not be able to link their pair. Apart from authentication blind
signature also satisfied Unforgeability, untraceability also [1,2,7,8,11–14,22]. The
blind signature scheme should preserve the following requirement:
• Blindness The message should be blind for a signer, on the other hand, we can
say that signer also not disguised the original content.
• Unforgeable An adversary even if he can imitate the user and freely interact
to the signer must not produce or copy a true signs on other documents
except for that signer signed.
• Correctness The Blind signature scheme must be correct.
• Unlinkablity A malicious signer must not be able to link output final signature
to the user for separate interaction with the user.
1.1 Framework of ID-Based Blind Signature
The concept of Identity-based scheme removed the need for a requester or sender
to look up the recipients public key before sending out an encrypted message
[1, 4, 11]. Identity-based cryptography provides a good convenient alternative to
conventional public-key infrastructures. An IDBS scheme consists of following
four phases [24].
Setup : The Key Generation Center runs to this phase on input, and makes the
public parameter’s prams of the scheme and a master challenge. Key Generation
Center publishes prams and retains the master unrevealed to itself.
Extract: For Given master secret, prams and identity ID, this phase created the
secret key SID.
Issue: The signer put a signature blindly for a person by the present scheme, which
2
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is further broken into three phases (Blind, BlindSign, Unblind).
Blind : User chooses some random string α or β for a given message m, it
generates an output with the help of hash function, let’s called it m´ and transfer
it to the person who had been signing authority. Sometimes, signer’s interactive
help needed by user.
Blind Sign: In Blind Sign phase, as an input insert the signers private key sID
that he used for signing the message and blind message m´ then in output it makes
a blind signature σ´ and transfers it to user.
Unblind : It generates the unblinded signature σ, for Given signature σ´and
random string α or β that used previously.
Verify : Given an identity ID, a message m, a signature σ and prams, this phase
output true if σ is a valid signature on m for identity ID, elsewhere false.
1.2 Basic Security Feature of ID-Based Blind
Signature Scheme
An IDBS should consist the following features Unforgeability, blindness and
correctness. These features are listed as bellow [20, 21]:
Definition 1 Correctness:Suppose a requester and a signer agree with an ID-based
blind signature protocol, then probability 1 − (1 ÷ (tc)), where t is a security
parameter, and c is a constant [29].Signer output and requesters outcome a s
must fulfill sv(s, ID,m, publicparameters) = accept. The probability calculated
over the randomness of setup, key generation and signature generation.
Definition 2 Blindness:IDBS scheme said to satisfied blindness feature when all
selective polynomial time attacker A
′
, A
′
says wins if and only if the wins getting
with at most the probability (1
2
+ 1
tc
),where t is a large number and c is a constant.
The calculation of above equation over the randomness of attacker and v0 and
v1 [29]. The blindness is a property of an IDBS scheme may be given through this
way.An attacker or malicious user let’s say A
′
,(v0, v1) are two requesters.
1. After getting public parameters param adversary can choose a random identity
3
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ID and (m0, m1) two messages.
2. Adversary A
′
,selects n ∈ 0, 1 randomly and kept n as private. After that, A
′
sends (mn, ID, param) to the requester v0 and (m1.n, ID, param) to the requester
v1 respectively.
3. Now A
′
execute the blind signature phase for (v0, v1).
4. If output of v0 and v1 along with true signature (mn, ID, σ0) and (m1.n, ID, σ1)
than it will be sent (σ0, σ1) to A
′
else give nothing to A
′
.
5. Adversary A
′
computes output and if gets n
′
∈ 0, 1 than we will say adversary
wins if (n
′
, n).
Definition 3 Ungorgeability: An attacker is known as a forger if he/she having
a tuple(P, t, Qe, Qs) for an IDBS scheme where in at most time t with at least
probability P using the number of times key generation Qe should have gotten at
most Qs times blind signature issuing phase. This is a sufficient and necessary
condition for declaring an attacker as a forger. On the other hand, we can declare
a blind signature scheme as an unforgeable if and only if there should not present
a two tuple (P, t, Qe, Qs) with same property.
The unforgeability property of IDBS scheme is given by the following game
between a malicious requester and challenger [20, 21, 29].
Setup:The challenger carries out the algorithm set of the identity-based blind
signature process and acquires both the master secret and public parameters.
The malicious requester is given public parameters, and master secret is kept by
champion.
Queries: The malicious requester can use two kinds of queries in a randomly
concurrent and loop way.
Key Generation Queries: The spiteful requester or attacker can be asked for
the master key of any identity(ID) of their choice. The challenger executed the
key generation phase and calculates a master key for every query of ID to the
spiteful requester.
Blind Signature Issue Related Queries: The spiteful requester may be
requested for blind signature of any ID on any message of his /her choice in an
interleaving and concurrent way. Challenger executed the key generating phase
4
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kg(params, ID) for each and every query of blind signature to get the secret key
dID of ID.After that the Challenger executed the blind signature issuing phase
with malicious requester. Where the malicious requester plays a role of requester,
and challenger plays the role of original signer.
Suppose n
′
is a number of runs of the blind signature signing phase where output
completed by challenger [18].time k is in the polynomial time where both get to
stop the process.
Forgery: We will declare a malicious user as a winner of game if he gets the
ultimately list of output as a valid signature l is (σ1, ID1, m1)..........(σi, IDi, mi)
such that:
1. It should be l > l
′
.
2. For every topple of i = 1, 2, ....l, sv(mi, σi, parami, IDi) = accept.
3. The malicious user had not designed a key generating query for any IDi, i ∈
〈1...l〉.
4. (mi, IDi) = (mj, IDj) for each topple of (i, j) with i 6= j where ∀i, j ∈ 〈1...l〉.
At the last, we will say Minforge to be a probability of an attacker wins the game.
Here the condition of probability is picking up over the toss of every coin design
by Malicious user and challenger.
1.3 Application of ID-Based Blind Signature
1.3.1 E-Voting System
E-voting is a most important application of blind signature scheme [21,48].To cast
vote and counting the electronic vote is known as electronic voting. In fig, voter is
free from of any fair because he/she put cast their vote blindly admin is nothing
but the authority who provides the sign. E-voting application may be organized
by any government representative, private organization, or any special group of
people. The privacy of user who cast the vote is keeping blind. Every user’s cast
vote can be easily verified with the help of admin’s identity. The confidentiality
issue related to digital signature is a bit solved by IDBS scheme.
5
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Figure 1.1: E-voting System using BS
1.3.2 E-cashing System
E-cashing is most concern applications of IDBS scheme, in given fig we show the
process how does use it [20].E-cashing consisting selling and buying of products or
services over the Internet and open network [9].IDBS scheme is a simply has been
used in today’s competitive market. In fig, we have shown all the process that
will be a good application of our scheme. An android based application have been
designed using IDBS idea in fig.User have to execute blind signature and verify
phase and the merchant distinguished with a bank’s authority. We will design our
concept in the future for this application.
1.3.3 E-Business
E-Business is a combination of ”e-mail” and ”e-commerce”.Both services conduct
under the open network or in the Internet, the selling and a significant part of
the early worry about the security of a business transaction on the Web, can be
solved with IDBS system.
6
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Figure 1.2: E-cashing using BS
1.4 Motivation and Objective
We have been understanding the importance and digital signature in every aspect
of information technology. In 90s the idea of DS is extended into BS [12].There is
a large number of IDBS schemes based on ECDLP, Bilinear have been proposed
but the problem is, that either we have to compromise with high computation
complexity or some security fault [1,4,7–9,11,20,21,24,29].So our clear objective
to make a scheme with the better security features along with low computation
overhead. So we have to define an algorithm based on DLP using ID based idea.
1.5 Problem Statement
The main goal of our design is given as listed below:
a IDBS scheme consisting DLP assumption.
b IDBS scheme should not be affected by a malicious user or cheater signer.
c It should meet all the security feature properly.
d The computation overhead should be low.
e The third party authentication also be encountered.
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f IDBS scheme must fulfill all the requirements namely
correctness,Unforgeability,unlink ability,and blindness.
1.6 Organization of Thesis
This thesis has been consisting in six parts. Chapter 1 is followed by survey
of IDBS scheme along with BS survey, and DS survey and their classification.
In chapter 3, we have given the proposed algorithm. The security analysis and
computation complexity describe in chapter 4. Result and Implementation idea
given in chapter 5. Finally, conclusion and future work of a proposed scheme are
given in chapter 6.
8
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Literature Survey
In this section, we reviewed the literature related to different blind signature
schemes and their security features. First, we give a brief overview of digital
signature, then preliminaries related to blind signature, hash function, random
number function,random number generation, prime number with primality test,
and some basic concepts of cryptography. Survey on different blind signature
scheme and IDBS scheme have been given in the middle, At the end,we reviewed
some popular IDBS schemes, and their classification based on security features.
2.1 Cryptography Concepts, Digital Signature
Signature and Blind Signature Requirement
Cryptography is a technique by which we can send our data protectively in
open network [22].Cryptography implies ”secret writing”,a art and science of
transferring information to make them secure and immune from attacks. On the
sender side plain text or original text, firstly, encrypted on chipper-text and it will
be decrypted on the receiver end in the form of plain text.
Cryptography basically divides into three measure part.
1. Symmetric key encipherment: In this technique, both senders as well
as a receiver has the single key, and used it for cryptographic operation.
9
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2. Asymmetric key enchiperment: These techniques also known as
public-key enchiperment where a sender used the public key of a receiver,
and receiver used his own private key for deciphering data.
3. Hashing: A variable length message converts or maps into fixed size
message digest [13,19]. The digest generally much smaller than the original
message.
2.1.1 Cryptographic Hash Function
It is a well-defined algorithm which can be applied on a group of data or piece of
information, often a single file, generating a value called checksum [19].It always
producing the result of fixed length from an arbitrary length of block such that any
minor change would be a very elevated change the value of hash with a elevated
probability. The input piece of information to be encoded is called as message
and the output of hash function is said to be as message digest [30]. Generally
a valid hash function consists some most important properties they are described
as first hash function should have a primage resistance that implies if a granted
hash key h it is very difficult to get any message m like h = hash(l, m), l is here
the hash key [6, 13]. Second is hash function should have a good enough collision
resistance it shows if two given message m1, m2 it is completely impossible to get
hash h such that h = hash(l1, m1) = hash(l2, m2), where l1,l2 are two hash keys.
The third property is a hash function should have second primage resistance that
means if a given message m1, such that hash(l, m1) = hash(l, m2),where l is a
hash key.
2.1.2 Prime Numbers and Primarility Tests
Primes are a special number in the family of integers because they are numbers
that do not have any non-trivial factors. Large prime numbers are used in most
cryptographic algorithms, and they have grown increasingly important for this
reason. Primality test is a method for determining whether a given input is prime
10
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or not [31]. It always shows the statics of a prime number, whether it is, this
did not give us any information about the factorization. The reason for using a
prime number because it ensured us that our choose number have not any other
factor. Factorization is a computational hard problem so finding whether the
number is prime is comparatively easy. Primality test basically divides into two
categories deterministic and probabilistic. Deterministic primality testing except
integer as an input and output is a prime or composite number. Deterministic test
determined based on absoluteness, whether a given number is prime. Till date of
today, there is no algorithm that would be feasible use for a large prime number.
In 2002, kayal and agrawal saxena proposed a scheme that performed primarily
tests on polynomial time [32].
Probabilistic testing based on uncertainty of a prime number that means we
said a number is probable prime till their primality may be demonstrated
deterministic-ally. This testing is much faster than deterministic [31].
2.1.3 Survey on Digital Signature Schemes
Digital signature is a method to conform the agreement of message [30].It is the
signature which only generated by signer and verifies by anyone in the network
through the protocol. The digital signature provides three basic requirements of
security but not the confidentiality, so it can be achieved with the help of blindness
of original information but the way of working gave only confidentiality between
user and signer.
Digital Signature must follow the two basic requirements [19, 26, 30, 33]:
Unforgeable: If a signer signed a document D with the signature σ, no one
can produce the same message signature pair(σ,D).it ensured that there would
not be any other message signature pair with same value rather than an original
message.
Authentic: If a signer signed a message M, then receiver or any other would
verify it, if he knows the public key of signer.The recipient convinced deliberately
to signer.
11
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A digital signature should not be alterable, reusable and non-repudiation [33]. In
1984, R.L.rivest, presented a method for obtaining digital signature [34]. This
was a method where encryption key’s open nature does not reveal the subsequent
decryption key. This proposal opened the door for new system known as the
public-key system.
In 1999, a modern proposal was given based on digital signature in RSA that
was a combined design of fault tolerance and hash function and digital signature
[33].Later on in 2003, Afzel Moore had proposed a new approach of conditional
access system architecture [35].XML digital signature were used in order to
distribute video, image data and audio file on the web in a encrypted manner.
In 2005, Gulin Wang proposed a new idea where the trusted third party is
involved when the one-party cheating or communication channel is interrupted
[33].In 2008, For an E-mechanism the use of secure crypto-environment being the
important issue of information security. All these these requirements might be
fulfilled with the integrated design based on SoC;Design was implemented with
SHA-2 using public-key cryptosystem [36]. A reconfigure hardware having a core
logic used with 2048 bits RSA digital signature scheme.
Later in 2008, Ming-Hsin Chang, adapted a new concept in a digital signature
world through only using ECDSA. Even using ECDSA and DSA still there were
lacked of characteristics of proxy signature, Ming has achieve a proxy delegation
with the help of only ECDSA [37]. A fast ECC based digital signature using
DSP scheme proposed by Ying Qin, where a variable window mechanism used,
therefore, combining NAF and sliding window with varying length reduce to
complexity of point multiplication of ECC [38].In 2010, a one-time authentication
approach has been proposed, which allow an owner to grant his right to a
temporary user without giving any actual information related to original password
[33].
In 2011, an unfeasible problem had been solved those were the preserving
transparency and optimistic fair exchange [39]. The role of secure trusted third
party to being involved if required and transparent for aﬄuent. This was the
best technique for solving a real-world problem. E-governance is the successful
12
Chapter 2 Literature Survey
application being developed with this methodology.
2.1.4 Survey on Blind Signature
The idea of blind signature has been proposed in 1983, based on RSA algorithm
[?].The main application of it to protect user’s privacy in the open network e.g.an
E-business, E-governance, E-case,E-voting systems [20, 22].In Digital Signature,
there are only two participants knows as signer and verifier used, but in a blind
signature scheme, three participants involved namely verifier,user,signer. First of
all,user or requester blinds the message with the help of some random parameters
and hash function. After getting the blind message signer will put the sign on
the message by applying his/her private key. Once the message signed by the
signer it sends back to the requester he/she unblind the message and submit it to
the verifier. After receiving the message-signature pair verifier used public key of
legitimate signer and verify it.
The basic differences in blind and digital signature are listed below [2]:
1. Message content needed not to be blind in digital signature from the signer,
but in a blind signature, it should be blind.
2. After publishing signature on a message signer ought not have the capacity
of linking the signature to message.
The basic characteristics that blind signature should possess are
unforgeability,correctness,blindness and untraceability.
2.1.5 Basic Concept of Blind Signature
In 1983, D. Chaum gave the idea of blind signature. This technique ensured the
secrecy of user [?]. In this approach two parties involved, one user A and other
signer B. User A wants sign on a message M by signer B. User, firstly, used hash
function on message M and changes to it in M
′
, and transfer it to a signer.
Signer creating the signature s
′
and put into M
′
and sends back to A. After
13
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getting s
′
user A unblinds into s this is nothing but the signature on a message
M.So user A protect the information and not to be revealed. On the other hand,
signer assigned a message signature pair (M, s), signer neither able in finding the
information about user for he sign a message nor about message.
Later on one-year D.chaum come with a new blind signature approach using RSA.
This approach consists three parties along with five phases that were namely as
Initializing,Blinding,Signing,Unblinding and Verifying.
The problem was with this scheme that the true blindness as well as unforgeability
not achieved.
Figure 2.1: Blind Signature Process.
In 2001, Y.M.Tseng et al. came with a blind signature approach that
depended on factoring problem [40].The problem with this approach was a large
key size required otherwise an adversary can forge the signature. The same
problem with this scheme also exit’s signer can trace the message. In 2003, C.C.
Lee, presented an untraceable blind signature scheme based on integer factorizing
problem and Extended Euclidean algorithm. This scheme has been satisfied
14
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untraceable property, but the problem where high overhead and long key size
required for safeness [41].
In 1994, M. A. Stadler et al. al. proposed first Discrete logarithm based
blind signature approach [2]. They presented two new blind signature scheme
in their proposal. The first one was blind signature scheme generated from
a little alteration of Digital Signature Algorithm. Second was based on The
Nyberg-Repels signature scheme. L .harm in 1995 announced that the blind
signature derived from DSA was providing not a true blind signature [42].Signer
can keep the message signature pair and after publishing the message signature
pair he/she can trace.Therefore,Camenic’s scheme did not satisfy the untraceable
property. Later on, on E. Mogammed and E. Emarah proposed a scheme had
less computational complexity and better in time from a technique that based on
the RSA algorithm [14].The problem with this scheme that in unblinding phase
requester has to keep some parameter and on the base of this, he can easily get
the private key of signer. So this scheme also did not satisfy the unforgeability. In
2010, a novel blind signature scheme presented by R.L.SHEN that derived from
discrete logarithm problem [43]. This scheme was satisfied all basic requirements.
2.2 Survey on ID Based Blind Signature
Schemes
IDBS approach being much more important since the public key of ones is simply
used as his identity. For example, example A real-life example is, if an electronic
case issued by the bank can be easily verified with the help of his identity it can
be anything may be a combination of string like banks name, city, country, and
year by any user or shops. They do not require to access or fetch a bank’s key
from PK center. Generic parallel attack is an open problem for schemes, based on
IFP of RSA scheme.
In 1984, Shamir comes with Identity-based cryptography concept [?]. The
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unique quality of this approach is that a users public key may be any binary
string. It can be an email address or any unique constraint that can identify the
user or signer.
The concept of Identity-based scheme removed the need for a requester or
sender to look up the recipients public key before sending out an encrypted
message. Identity-based cryptography provides a good convenient alternative
to conventional public-key insfrastured [11, 19]. There are many identity-based
signature schemes [1, 4, 7, 8, 11, 20, 21, 24, 29] have been proposed since 1984, but
only appeared was in 2001 that was satisfied Identity-based encryption [45]. The
advantage of ID Based scheme is that it simplified the process of key management.
In the past couple of the year, there are several bilinear paring has been applied
to various applications in cryptography [11, 17, 44].
The first IDBS scheme was proposed by Zhang and Kim, in 2002 [46]. The security
of their scheme depends on the factorization of ROS problem. In 2002, Wagner
claimed that the security of Zhang Kims scheme can be broken within time to
break ROS problem. In 2002, K. Kim presented a scheme, but it was inefficient
to implement and resistance against parallel attack was still not solved. Later
in 2003 Zhang and Kim proposed a new ID based scheme that based on bilinear
paring [47]. They claimed that their scheme is not depended on ROS problem.
Huang et al. proposed an efficient IBBS scheme was more forgeable under problem
is solvable. In 2010, Hu and Huang and Zhang et al. proposed an IBBS scheme
in a standard model [29]. We prove that our scheme has existential unforgeability
under the computation Diffe-Hellman assumption. Our scheme is very useful to
develop an e-cash system.
2.2.1 Classification of ID-Based Blind Signature
There are five types are schemes that are mainly divided into five categories:
1. ID Based Blind Signature: These schemes are based on a simple blind
signature concept, only change is that instead of public-key signer’s ID used
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for verification process.No need to manage a PKI unit at all. ID can be used
by anyone for verification purpose [1, 4, 8, 9, 29].
2. ID Based Restrictive Blind Signature: Restrictive blind signature
schemes which allow a user to receive a signed message without getting
to reveal his private content of the message, but the selection of the message
should be restricted. It should follows some constraint.
3. ID Based Partially Blind Signature:Signer should explicitly add some
extra information. Extra information can be anything, date of expiration,
time stamp, or whatever.On the resultant signature under some prerequisite
agreement with user [23].
In 2007, a partial blind signature concept was given efficiently than had
less computation complexity and equal privacy concern than Chan et al’s
scheme [21]. Chan’s scheme does not satisfy the restrictiveness and double
spending problem.
4. ID Based Restrictive partially Blind Signature: Restrictiveness and
partially both are an important security concerns on cryptography. A blind
signature scheme which is based on this two property called IDPR-blind
signature [20, 21, 23, 24].Fangguo Zhang claimed that their scheme was
secure(provably) in the random oracle model [20].Their scheme was used
to build an off-line, an untraceable E-cash system.
5. ID Based Proxy Blind Signature: A proxy signer used his/her private
key for signature instead of original signer. This is a combination of proxy
and blind signature concept. In 2008, first proxy based scheme was given but
the problem with the scheme, it does not fulfill the untraceability property
[15]. The proxy signer can forge the secret key of original signer and grant
the authorities to others. In 2011, Ni Zhang had presented an efficient
scheme that satisfied the untraceability [49].In 2013, a more feasible and
secure ECDLP based scheme presented by sundram which solved a common
problem of revoke of delegation by original signer [50].
17
Chapter 2 Literature Survey
2.3 Chapter Summary
The review of various ID- Based signature given us the real concept for enhanced
security feature to be adaptable in the really world.ID-Based system has no need
of PKD. Any entity’s public key can be used as his/her identity. Signature can
be verified with signer’s identity instead of public key. The most reliable attack
traceability, forgeability has found on various schemes. Many schemes provided
a secured system but failed due to computation complexity and in-feasibility of
implementation. Thus after reviewing the different kind of schemes proposed till
the date, we have given a new concept that is low computational overhead and
satisfied all security requirements.
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Identity Based Blind Signature
Scheme based upon DLP
We proposed a Novel IDBS scheme, which provides untraceability,unforgeability
and blindness to every entity. A secure trusted third party involved in proposed
technique who initiates the blinding process. Identity of signer is used for
verification of signature.
3.1 Proposed Scheme
The proposed IDBS Scheme consists of three participants namely, Trusted third
party, Signer,User.The scheme having been following Six phases.
Table 3.1: Parameters used in the proposed scheme
Parameter Function
p A large prime number
q A large prime factor of (p− 1)
g An element(generator) of Z∗n
XA The secret key of the trusted party
YA The public key of the trusted party where YA = g
XAmodp
H(.) A secure one way hash function
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3.1.1 Setup Phase
The trusted party chooses p as a large prime and q as a prime factor of (p−1),after
that he chooses g as a generator in Z∗n. The trusted party chooses his secret key
XA in Z
∗
n and computes his public key YA as
YA = g
XAmodp (3.1)
The trusted party random select k in Z∗n and computes
r = gkmodp (3.2)
Ss = (k + rXA)modp (3.3)
trusted party then sends (r, Ss) to the signer so that he can calculate his ID and
authenticity of a trusted party.
3.1.2 Extract
The signer checks trusted party’s authentication as follows. gSs = r.Y rA(g
k.gr∗XA =
r ∗ Y rA) If the particular parameter given by trusted party is authenticated, then
than he chooses XB in random in Z
∗
n and computes YB as a parameter
YB = g
XBmodp (3.4)
in a continuation signer computes the secret key for signing purpose s = Ss +
XBmodp and the identity that will be used for verification purpose. The ID of
signer calculated as
IDB = g
smodp (3.5)
3.1.3 Blinding
The signer executes following protocol with user. The signer has been provided
some agreement parameter so that user can blind his original message with some
restriction. The signer chooses l, tR ∈ Z
∗
n and computes t3 = g
−smodp
t1 = XB ∗ (l)
−1modp (3.6)
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t2 = s ∗ (XB)
−1modp (3.7)
µ = glmodp (3.8)
and send (µ, t1, t2, t3) to the user.
The user chooses α, β in random fashion in Z∗n and computes
t˙ = H(m,µt1Y t2B g
−αµt
β
3 )modp (3.9)
t = t˙+ β ∗modq (3.10)
and send t to the signer.
3.1.4 Signing
After receiving t signer use his secret key and sign the blind content that provides
by the user. Signer computes
s˙ = (l − ts)modp (3.11)
and send s˙ the user.
3.1.5 Unblinding
After receiving s˙, the signed blind content user applied his random selected
parameter for unblinking the message, and he get the signature along with their
original message without losing his secret.Than the user computes
s¨ = (s˙− α)modq (3.12)
(s¨, t˙, IDB) This is nothing but the ID along with massage m.
3.1.6 Verification
After receiving (s¨, t˙, IDB), anyone publicly can verify the signature by using the
IDB.
The verifier computes t¨ as
t¨ = H(m, YBID
(1+t˙)
B g
s¨)modp (3.13)
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Check if (t¨ = t˙).,than the signature is valid and acceptable otherwise it should be
rejected.
The message exchanging process or logical view of our scheme is given in below
fig.
Figure 3.1: The step by step view of our algorithm
3.2 Chapter Summary
Our proposed scheme has been given in above work. Our scheme is based on
DLP, which is declared as a computational hard problem. We combined unit of
two features BS and ID. ID of signer is used for verification purpose that will
remove the need of PKI and extra overhead.All the working steps shown in a
sequence in the above sections.
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Security Analysis of Proposed
Algorithm
4.1 Security Analysis of Proposed Scheme
The security of the proposed work based upon complexity of solve computational
hard assumption such as DLP,IFP,CDHP.
4.1.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given amodp or anmodp find n, put it in another
way we need to compute loga b where a, b, pǫZ
∗
p this is called discrete logarithm
problem. As we know DLP is an example of Computation hard problem it is
impossible to solve [1, 2, 7, 10, 13].
The public key of the trusted party is calculated as
YA = g
XAmodp (4.1)
this shows the discrete logarithm problem so for calculating XA we need to
calculate the discrete logarithm of YA to base g so as we know that DLP is a
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computational hard problem, and hence our scheme is secure.
The identity of Signer is computed as
IDB = g
smodp (4.2)
so if an attacker wants to know the sign parameter s, he/she should be computing
a discrete logarithm of IDB base g so it is also a computational hard problem, so
we can say that our scheme is secure.
4.1.2 Diffie-Hellman Problem
The diffie-hellman problem is a given prime p as a generator a given prime p and
generator gǫZ∗p and given that the element g
mmodp and gnmodp it is hard to find
gmnmodp.The CDLP is treated as a hard computation problem reducible to DLP
in a polynomial time. In our Algorithm, we have to used g−αmodp and g−βmodp,
but the attacker cannot be able to calculated g−α∗βmodp, so we can also assume
here that based on CDHP, our scheme is secure.
4.1.3 Correctness
The blind signature s for a message M is indeed a valid signature. This can be
checked with the help of IDB.
Proof: The correctness of blind signature is given as below:
(µt1Y t2B g
−αµg(−sβ)) = (gl)(XB(l)
−1)(gXB)(s(XB)
−1)(g−α)(gl)(g)(−s(β))
gXBgsg−αglg−(sβ)
YBg
sg−αg(s˙+t˙s)g−(sβ)
YBg
(s−α)g(s˙)+s(t˙+β)g−(sβ)
YBg
sg−αgs˙+st˙+sβ−sβ
YBg
sg−αg(s˙+st˙)
YBg
(s−α+s˙+st˙)
YBg
(s˙−α)+s(1+t˙)
YBg
s¨+s(1+t˙)
YBg
s¨ID
(1+t˙)
B
24
Chapter 4 Security Analysis of Proposed Algorithm
Theorem 1: It is impossible to create a valid signature.
Proof: For creating a valid signature s attacker should know XB,Ss both that
imply attacker have control on both the parties that is likely to be impossible
because in our scheme, both trusted party and signer are distinguishable even if
both are not separate than also an attacker cannot create a valid signature so it is
completely impossible to create it. Even trusted party also cannot forge s because
he does not have any idea about XB.
Theorem 2: To determine the signer from two given signature is completely
impossible.
Proof: Suppose we have two messages M and N respectively signed by a signer.
The proposed signature schemes are depended on DLP where we have
M, s1, ⌊M,µ
t1Y t2B g
−αµt
β
3⌋ (4.3)
N, s2, ⌊N, µ
t1Y t2B g
−αµt
β
3⌋ (4.4)
The above equations surely follow unlinkability as two signatures are hash or
message digests along with a secret parameter of signer side as well as the user
side so only the signature can be an analysis with the digest attacker or adversary
cannot link the parameter, on the other hand, user side parameter α, β have
random value so adversary cannot reveal anything about a signer.
Theorem 3:No one can link the signature message pair even signer also cannot.
Proof: The property of unlinkability also known as untraceable that emphasis
on the tracability or linkability of the message-signature pair after publishing it.
Untraceability is an important property of the blind signature scheme.
Supposed signer keeps the message signature pair
(s¨, t˙, IDB)
at the second glance it would be something like
(s1¨, t1˙, IDB)
. In our scheme as we used hash message along with some random parameter α, β
so it is totally impractical to get the value of arbitrary parameter and after apply
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the correct hash function. So for a malicious signer it is definitely impossible.
Theorem 4: Trusted party as well as a signer both required equal authentication
in our proposed work.
Proof: As our design the identity of signer computed from the trusted party’s
public key YA thus trusted party will not deny his agreement. On the other
situation signer identity involved in blinding. Therefore, the signer can be
identified from his identity(IBB), so after that signer did not deny his agreement
also so we can say that trusted party as well as a signer both required
authentication.
Theorem 5: Our scheme satisfied the blindness property.
Proof: We have to use the message blindness along with some signer’s sent
parameter that is t1, t2, t3.After attached that parameter user also generated
random parameter α, β and put it with an input message which should pass
through the hash function all this combination is present by this equation
t˙ = H(m,µt1Y t2B g
−αµt
β
3 )modp (4.5)
The hash function we are using in our scheme is SHA-2, which is the most secure
message digest so if a malicious signer cannot reveal anything about a true message
that’s why we can say that our scheme satisfied blindness property as well.
Theorem 6: Our scheme is verifiable.
Proof: Our scheme can be verified by anyone after publishing the message
signature pair (s¨, t˙, IDB). it can be verified by that equation:
t¨ = H(m, YBID
(1+t˙)
B g
s¨)modp (4.6)
after calculating the value of t¨ it can be publicly checked if (t¨ = t˙). it is true than
a pair is original otherwise rejected. So based on this our scheme is verifiable.
Theorem 7: Our scheme shows resistance against side channel attack.
Proof: First of all, we have to look what side channel includes, this attack
consists of side channel information that is neither based the original message nor
the digest, only some side information like time analysis of computing a phase or
equation.Simple power variation or differential power variation will help out for
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this attack [51].
Timing attack: Suppose we have runs a modular function in non fixed time
total blind signature time must be correlated with the time
s = Ss +XBmodp (4.7)
but further we know in our scheme Ss computed as
Ss = (k + rXA)modp (4.8)
where r = gk and they are generated by trusted party due to participation of the
two-party parameters the modular computation completely synchronize to each
other. The most significant bit of s are basically depended on Ss → XB → XA.
So for knowing the first most bits you should know the trusted party as well as a
signer but in our scheme, they both are transparent to each other. Suppose any
condition the adversary has luck to get to identify both he/she must know every
set of most bits that will be a computation hard problem. So we can say that our
scheme has a good enough resistance against the time attack.
Theorem 8: Our scheme has satisfied chosen Chiper text attack.
Proof: Choosen chiper text attack model for which cryptanalysis the adversary
gather information in a small part or at least a single part by choosing a chipertext
and its secret under an unknown key [6, 9, 18].
Supposed the adversary wants to put a choosen chiper text attack so that he
has to collect for parameter (c1, c2, c3, c4) and compute this equation
(c1, c2, c3, c4) = H(m,µ
t1Y t2B g
−αµt
β
3 )modp (4.9)
with
µ = glmodp (4.10)
and
YB = g
XBmodp (4.11)
in unblinding he used
v = atom(cXB1 .c
l
2) (4.12)
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if c4 = v then output should be m = atom(c1.c3) else output rejects. Since
we have to be used here cascading of four parameters the task to get a chipper
text to another significant message unachievable at all because of computational
hardness of DLP. If an adversary wants to choose random values for c2, c3, c4 is
also impossible to get it in infinite time for a computing manner. On the other
scenario, message contains three parameter µ, t1, t2 that are further being complex
because they are not directly calculated so it also meaning less the problem for an
adversary to how would adjust nonlinear data. How will get a relevant relation.So
it is completely secure against chosen chipper text attack.
4.2 Performance Analysis of Proposed Scheme
The complexity of all signature schemes generally emphasis on four operations
namely inverse, multiplication, exponential operation and hash function. As we
our well knowledge there is no other ID based blind signature scheme based on
the discrete logarithm problem. So our scheme is novel that is why we have not
compared to any other scheme.
In our analysis, we ignored the time to performing modular addition, and
subtraction.
We have to used the following notation for analysis performance of our proposed
scheme.
TH is the computation time required for performing hash function.
TI is the computation time required for inverse operation.
TM is the computation time required for multiplication operation.
TE is the computation time required for Exponential operation.
Table 4.1: Analysis of computational complexity
Blinding Signature Generation Signature Verification Total
4TE + 4TM + TH 4TE + 2TI + 2TM 2TE + 2TM 10TE + 8TM + 2TI + TH
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4.3 Chapter Summary
Our proposed scheme has to be analyzed with respect to many requirements, which
have included correctness,unforgeability,untraceability,blindness,and distinguish
of signer and trusted party and verifiability.
Our scheme has been passed all the test cases efficiently with respect to all
security aspects. We have done performance analysis in second part of this
chapter as our scheme is novel, so we need not compared it to with other schemes.
Our proposed scheme has been implemented with java under some assumption
described in next chapter.
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Implementation and result
5.1 Implementation
The implementation of our proposed scheme is done using java platform, and
we have not been using any key storing concept in our algorithm so no need
to use any database. We have done implementation using Itellij IDEA 13.1 as
integrated development environment. In implementation of our scheme, we have
to used java big integer value where security package and crypto packages for
generating random number and secret key parameter for trusted party and signer,
the hash function algorithm is used for blinding the message along with some
random parameter by the user entity in blinding phase.
We have to generate prime number using the util package of java. Here we have
used three party’s namely trusted party, user and signer and the key parameter
size is tested with 64 bits, 256 bits and 1024 bits. The message sizes are 5 KB and
8 KB. We have done the blinding of the message with the help of Hash function,
SHA-2 is used in our implementation.
The standard hardware configuration(minimum) that should be supported is given
as below:
1. Hard disk should be 150GB.
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2. RAM should be 2GB.
3. OS can be users choose; we have to a used window platform system.
The implementation consists of following steps in the proposed scheme:
1. Setup
2. Extract
3. Blinding
4. Signature
5. Unblinding
6. Verification
The values for setup phases are given is bellow:
Generator g = 174068207532402095185811980123523436538604490794561350978495831040599953488
Figure 5.1: View of Setup Phase
455823147851597408940950725307797094915759492368300574252438761037084473467180148876118
1030830437549851909834726015504946913294880833954923138500003616464826446084923040787218
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18959999056496097769368017749273708962006689187956744210730
Prime number p is p = 17801190547854226652823756245015999014523215636912067427327445031444286
73702077061269525212346307956715678477846644997065077092072785705000966838814403412974
5221171818506047231150039301079959358067395348717066319802262019714966524135060945913707
594956514672855690606794135837542707371727429551343320695239
Prime Factor is q=864205495604807476120572616017955259175325408501
Check, whether the value of p and q is correct or not using the value of p mod
q=1
Check, whether p, q, and g is a correct gq mod p = 1
private key Xa = 409659790927730574991357522829154700552286323107
public key YA = 1493394944821711258681625474640608941479589897774917274513474288260046566040
951206072349965093937879378888965633400607599314439362015729489961727895103959947649989
00968359443324086905016929186040497936739970
07938696179930494647416316642405462506063841047437524142597942010268252016958714928640
752205929000837
Check, whether the value of XA,YA is valid or not
gXA mod p = 1493394944821711258681625474640608941479589897774917274513474288260046566040
9512060723499650939378793788889656334006075993144393620157294899617278951039599476499890
0968359443324086905016929186040497936739970079386961799304946474163166424054
62506063841047437524142597942010268252016958714928640752205929000837
Which verifies the public key Ya.
K=387050839090005494030880584562763419807706397966
r=11062620838003446491875059322164660254595456257819730701207713489196390
7920060058955226995811348529659690806250620677107780259042421869557195260869449407
29073060776795460867600051499548332352314506873348769415915672121708364910304082355
0015688105032133147726096570396644785014304774933103946058290950087862213
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Figure 5.2: The view of Blinding
The value which we have given to hash at the time of message
blinding=970603612472668034939407278342906337920997446123135466405676208000686325138
7265914878865239685976984851486396638937078491611588317821447487958328285590183146
64324143109256705892888421649792550852682072480901425740519885519434147699
11775290025579944820837534890610603810596794378185975469399230918656210699894
The value what we get after hashing means it is nothing but the digest message.
HASH=314572855602703196089163068733353561370
The Digest T˙=314572855602703196089163068733353561370
This is the test for whatever the value get after
hash=314572855602703196089163068733353561370
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Figure 5.3: The view of Verification
Values in Verification Phase
T˙ = 314572855602703196089163068733353561370
T¨= 314572855602703196089163068733353561370
5.2 Results
Analysis of Execution Time
The proposed scheme is implemented with processor intel(R)core(TM)i3 along
with 3 GB RAM in using java as a programming language. We have calculated
the time of each phase based using ”System Time.” Time”. All phases have
been implemented using fair system time on the same hardware on the same
environment.
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Table 5.1: Analysis of Execution time(msec)
Blinding Signing Verification Keysize(Bytes)
1.7502 ms 0.005 ms 0.061 ms 8
20 ms 0.0099 ms 0.145 ms 10
Table 5.2: Analysis of Size of Signature in Bytes
Size of Message(Bytes) Size of Signature(Bytes)
5000 8
5.3 Chapter Summary
All the Results and Implementation have been revealed in above section we got
our algorithm is correct mathematically as well as programmatic way.The results
can vary with other hardware and software environment.
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Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed an identity-based blind signature scheme that is having all
security features with low computational overhead as well as feasible.We
proved that our scheme has satisfied all the security goals of IDBS
system like Unforgeability,Untraceability,Unlinkablity,Correctness,Verifiable and
Blindness.As our best knowledge our we have given the first concept of this two
notation together. In future our scheme can be used to get a fair system policy
in e-commerce.With the help of our scheme a more secure E-cashing, E-voting,
E-business can be build up in a great way.The given may be used for perfect crime
avoidance also. All the faults of todays existing IDBS system has solved by our
scheme.
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